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The block cipher GOST (GOST 28147-89) is a Russian standard for en-
cryption and message authentication that is included in OpenSSL 1.0.0. In
this paper, we present meet-in-the-middle attacks on several block ciphers,
each consisting of 22 or fewer rounds of GOST. Our 22-round attack on
rounds 10–31 requires only 5 known plaintexts and a computational effort
equivalent to testing about 2223 keys for a success probability of 1− 2−65.
This attack is the best (going by the number of rounds) low data complex-
ity key-recovery attack on GOST.
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1 Introduction
The GOST block cipher (GOST 28147-89) is a Russian standard for en-
cryption and message authentication [1]. From hereon, we will refer to
it as “GOST” for simplicity. It was designed in the erstwhile USSR, and
declassified in 1989. This cipher is used in several applications, including
OpenSSL 1.0.0, an open source toolkit for SSL/TLS [2].
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Attack Ref. # Rounds Time Data Pr[Success]
MitM This paper 8 2127 3 KPs 1− 2−65
MitM This paper 9, 10 2159 3 KPs 1− 2−33
MitM This paper 11, 12 2191 4 KPs 1− 2−65
Differential [5] 13 Not given 251 CPs Not given
MitM This paper 13, 14 2223 4 KPs 1− 2−33
MitM This paper 16 2223 5 KPs 1− 2−65
MitM This paper 22 2223 5 KPs 1− 2−65
Slide [6] 24 264 ≈ 264 KPs Not given
Slide [6] 30 2253.7 ≈ 264 KPs Not given
Reflection [7] 30 2224 232 KPs Not given
Reflection-MitM [4, 8] 32 2225 232 KPs Not given
Table 1: Full-key recovery attacks on GOST; if explicitly stated in the original paper,
success probabilities are given as well (KP: known plaintext, CP: chosen plaintext, MitM:
meet-in-the-middle)
Both GOST and the US standard DES [3] are Feistel networks. GOST
has 32 rounds, a block size of 64 bits and a key size of 256 bits. Following its
release to the public, several cryptanalysis results were published. Full-key
recovery attacks on GOST are listed in Table 1. In this table, we omitted
related-key attacks. Recently, attacks on the full 32 rounds of GOST have
appeared. In our table, we include the reflection meet-in-the-middle attack
by Isobe et al. [4], Note that our attacks are the best low data complexity
attacks on GOST.
The meet-in-the-middle attack. Let M and K denote the message
space and the key space, respectively. Let AK , BK : M × K → M
denote two block ciphers and let YK = BK ◦AK , where ◦ denotes function
composition. In a meet-in-the-middle attack, the adversary deduces K
from a known plaintext-ciphertext pair (p, c), where c = YK(p), by solving
AK(p) = B
−1
K (c).
In this paper, we use a variant of this technique to attack 16 rounds of
GOST. In this approach, the place where the meet-in-the-middle occurs is
at the subkeys instead of at the intermediate texts. This technique, which
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we call subkey meet-in-the-middle, will be explained in Sect. 4. Our work
is inspired by recent meet-in-the-middle attacks on XTEA [9].
Contribution of this paper. In this paper, we present meet-in-the-
middle attacks on block ciphers consisting of up to 22 rounds of GOST.
Our aim is to find out the maximum number of rounds that can be attacked
given the following criteria:
1. The key is recovered with an information theoretically optimal prob-
ability of success indicated by the unicity distance [10].
2. The attack is in a non-related-key setting.
3. The attack works for the full key space (i.e., no classes of weak keys
are used).
4. Very few known plaintext-ciphertext pairs (KPs) are required.
These criteria make the scenario very difficult from the point of view of
the attacker. In Table 1, the 24-round and 30-round slide attacks require
almost the entire codebook. For the 32-round differential attack, the entire
codebook is required. The 30-round reflection attack and 32-round reflec-
tion meet-in-the-middle attack also require a large number of KPs when
compared to our 22-round attack, whereas the time complexities are sim-
ilar. Therefore, our 22-round attack may be regarded as the best attack
(going by the number of rounds) to recover the key with a low data com-
plexity. All the attacks in this paper have negligible memory requirements.
This will be immediately apparent from the description of the attacks, be-
cause the intermediate calculations do not have to be retained in memory.
Biryukov and Wagner show in [11] that the reversal in the order in which
the subkeys are used in the last 8 rounds, helps preclude slide attacks. We
find that this reversal is responsible for many of the attacks (including the
22-round one) in this paper.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. The specifications of
GOST algorithm are given in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we describe our attacks
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on block ciphers consisting of up to 14 rounds of GOST. Sections 4 and 5
describe our attacks on 16 and 22 GOST rounds, respectively. We suggest
countermeasures and conclude the paper in Sect. 6.
2 Description of GOST
First, we introduce the following notation. Addition and subtraction mod-
ulo 232 will be represented by ⊞ and ⊟ respectively. We will use ⊕ to
denote exclusive-OR,≪ for left rotation and ‖ for concatenation.
The block cipher GOST has a block size of 64 bits and a key size of 256
bits. It is a 32-round Feistel network in which each round uses eight 4× 4
S-boxes.
The 256-bit keyK of GOST is divided into eight 32-bit subkeysK0, . . . , K7.
At every round, one of the 8 subkeys is selected according to a simple key
schedule. The 32-bit subkey αi used in round i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 32, is chosen
from the set {K0, . . . , K7} according to the following rule:
αi ←
{
Ki−1 mod 8 if i ∈ {1, . . . , 24} ,
K32−i mod 8 if i ∈ {25, . . . , 32} .
(1)
In this paper, we will show that the reversal of the round-key order (in
the last 8 rounds) is not a good design choice with respect to meet-in-the-
middle attacks.
The 64-bit input to round i of GOST consists of two 32-bit parts Li−1
and Ri−1. For round 1, the plaintext p is used as input: (L0 ‖ R0) ← p.
The input for round i+ 1 is computed iteratively from the input to round
i as given by Li ← Ri−1 and Ri ← Li−1 ⊕ (S(Ri−1⊞ αi)≪ 11). We select
αi according to (1). The concatenated output from the 8 S-boxes of round
i is denoted by S(x), where x is split into 4-bit words.
The ciphertext c of GOST is produced by concatenating the two parts
obtained after the 32nd round: c ← R32 ‖ L32. A full description of the
GOST block cipher is given in [1].
Note that [1] does not specify the S-boxes. Saarinen [12] has developed
an attack with 232 CPs to recover the S-boxes, assuming the attacker has
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# Rounds Rounds
8 18–25, 19–26, 20–27, 21-28, 22-29, 23-30, 24-31
9 18–26, 19–27, 20–28, 21-29, 22-30, 23-31
10 18–27, 19–28, 20–29, 21-30, 22-31
11 18–28, 19–29, 20–30, 21-31
12 18–29, 19–30, 20–31
13 18–30, 19–31
14 18–31
Table 2: All r-round reduced block ciphers (8 ≤ r ≤ 14) with unused subkeys
black box access to the encryption device, and can specify the key used
to encrypt. As his attack works for any number of rounds, it can be used
to turn each of the attacks in this paper into an attack with secret S-
boxes. The attacker first performs Saarinen’s chosen-key attack to recover
the S-boxes. Following this, let us suppose that the attacker intercepts a
communication involving an unknown/secret key. The attacker can now,
with his knowledge of the S-boxes, use our meet-in-the-middle techniques
to recover this key.
3 Unused Subkey Attacks on up to 14 Rounds of
GOST
In this section, we show how to construct an attack on block ciphers con-
sisting of r rounds of GOST, where 8 ≤ r ≤ 14. In each of these block
ciphers, at least one subkey is not used. Therefore, exhaustive search re-
quires less than 2255 encryptions on average.
From (1), we obtain ciphers with unused subkey(s). Table 2 lists all
these ciphers.
We now evaluate the data and time required for attacking the block
ciphers listed in Table 2. Let us consider a block cipher in which s 32-bit
subkeys, 1 ≤ s ≤ 4, are not used.
Given one plaintext-ciphertext pair (p0, c0), with each key guess, the
attacker checks whether
E
(a...a+r−1)
K (p0) = c0 , (2)
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where E
(a...a+r−1)
K denotes the r-round (rounds a to a + r − 1) encryption
using the k-bit key K, where k = (256 − 32 · s). One KP is not suffi-
cient, because the key space (2256−32·s keys K) is larger than the ciphertext
space (264 ciphertext blocks). Therefore, the attacker requires more known
plaintext-ciphertext pairs to determine the key K with sufficiently high
probability. The number of KPs is denoted by n.
For every candidate k-bit key K, the attacker tests (2) using the first
KP. If this equality is satisfied, the attacker uses a subsequent KP to check
E
(a...a+r−1)
K (pj) = cj , (3)
where j is at most n− 1. If one of the n equations (2), (3) is not satisfied,
the candidate key K is incorrect and can be discarded.
Throughout this paper, we use the reasonable assumption that every
block cipher under consideration has perfect confusion and diffusion prop-
erties as defined by Shannon [10]. If either the plaintext or the key, or both
are changed, we assume that the corresponding ciphertext will be generated
uniformly at random, independent from previously obtained ciphertexts.
With this assumption, each of the 64-bit conditions resulting from (2),
(3) is satisfied with probability 2−64. We now calculate the data and time
complexities for our attacks. All time complexities are stated as the number
of equivalent encryptions of the reduced-round block cipher.
The average success probability can be calculated as follows. The n
64-bit conditions are simultaneously satisfied with probability 2−n·64. The
attacker can therefore eliminate a wrong key with probability 1 − 2−n·64.
Assume that key m is the correct key, where 0 ≤ m < 2k. This key will
be found by our attack if all previous keys are eliminated. This happens
with probability (1 − 2−n·64)m. The correct key can be located anywhere
among the list of 2k candidate keys with equal probability. Therefore, the
average success probability is
2−k ·
2k−1∑
m=0
(1− 2−n·64)m = 2n·64−k · (1− (1− 2−n·64)2
k
)
≈ 2n·64−k · (1− e−2
k−n·64
)
≈ 1− 2k−n·64−1 , (4)
6
s n k Average time complexity Average success probability
1 4 224 2223 1− 2−33
2 4 192 2191 1− 2−65
3 3 160 2159 1− 2−33
4 3 128 2127 1− 2−65
Table 3: Time complexities and success probabilities of attacks of Sect. 3 for several values
of s and n
assuming 2k−n·64 ≈ 0. The approximations result from using the first and
the second order Taylor approximations of ex around 0. We now calculate
the time complexity of the attack. For a candidate key K to be determined
as wrong, the expected number of trials is 1 + 2−64 + . . .+ 2−(n−1)·64. The
average (equivalent) number of encryptions of the algorithm is given by:
2−k ·
2k−1∑
m=0
(
m · (1 + 2−64 + . . .+ 2−(n−1)·64) + n
)
=
1
2
·
1− 2−n·64
1− 2−64
· (2k − 1) + n . (5)
Table 3 gives the average time complexities and the average success
probabilities for various values of s (= (256 − k)/32) and n. The approx-
imate number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are needed can also be
calculated from Shannon’s unicity distance [10] as ⌈k/64⌉.
4 Subkey Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on 16-Round
GOST
In this section, we analyze the block cipher consisting of rounds 17–32 of
GOST. We begin with the observation that K7 is used consecutively in
rounds 24 and 25.
Our attack assumes that the S-boxes are bijective. Note, however, that
a similar attack works for non-bijective S-boxes, but then the computations
of the time complexity and success probability become more involved.
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Let K = (K0, K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, X), where X is not relevant to
the analysis because the attacker exhaustively searches over all subkeys
except K7. For every candidate key K, the attacker computes E
(17...23)
K (p0),
given a plaintext-ciphertext pair (p0, c0), and gets L23 and R23. Similarly,
the attacker computes D
(26...32)
K (c0) and gets L25 and R25. Using α24 =
S−1((L25 ⊕ L23)≫ 11) ⊟ R23 and α25 = S
−1((R25 ⊕ R23)≫ 11) ⊟ L25,
the subkeys used in rounds 24 and 25 are obtained. If they are equal (for a
wrong candidate key K, this happens with probability 2−32),1 the attacker
sets K7 ← α24 = α25.
Then, using n−1 other plaintext-ciphertext pairs (pj, cj), 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1,
the attacker tests if E
(17...32)
K (pj) = cj with the value found for K7. A wrong
key will pass these tests with probability 2−32 ·
(
2−64
)n−1
= 2−32−(n−1)·64.
Thus, with probability 1−2−32−(n−1)·64, a wrong key is eliminated. Using a
similar reasoning as in Sect. 3, we obtain the average success probability:
2−224 ·
2224−1∑
m=0
(1− 2−32−(n−1)·64)m
= 232+(n−1)·64−224 · (1− (1− 2−32−(n−1)·64)2
224
)
≈ 232+(n−1)·64−224 · (1− e−2
224−32−(n−1)·64
)
≈ 1− 2224−32−(n−1)·64−1 , (6)
where the approximations hold when n ≥ 5. We now calculate the time
complexity of the attack. For a candidate keyK to be determined as wrong,
the expected number of trials is 1+2−32+2−32−64+ . . .+2−32−(n−2)·64. This
is because for every candidate key K, the attacker always checks whether
the subkeys used in rounds 24 and 25 agree. For 2−32 candidate keys,
the attacker uses the second known plaintext, for 2−96 the attacker uses
the third known plaintext, and so on. If the candidate key is correct, the
attacker always performs n encryptions. As the correct key can be located
anywhere in the list of 2224 candidates keys with equal probability, the
1If the texts obtained by encrypting p0 and decrypting c0, in the 13 outer rounds, are dis-
tributed uniformly at random, then so are the subkeys in rounds 24 and 25.
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average number of 16-round computations is
2−224 ·
2224−1∑
m=0
(
m · (1 + 2−32 + 2−32−64 + . . . +2−32−(n−2)·64) + n
)
=
1
2
· (1 + 2−32 + 2−32−64 + . . .+ 2−32−(n−2)·64) · (2224 − 1) + n .
(7)
Substituting n = 5 in (6) and (7), the average success probability is 1−2−65
and the average number of 16-round computations is 2223.
5 Attack on 22-Round GOST
From (1), we observe that the subkey K0 is used only once in the block ci-
pher consisting of rounds 10–31 of GOST. Therefore, here the attacker first
checks for the equality of R16 and R
′
16. These are obtained by respectively
computing E
(10...16)
K (p0) and D
(18...31)
K (c0), where
K = (X,K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6, K7) . (8)
As subkey K0 is not necessary to perform these partial encryptions and
decryptions, X can be any 32-bit value.
If R16 = R
′
16 (this happens with probability 2
−32), the corresponding
value of K0 (= α17) is obtained using:
α17 = S
−1((R17 ⊕ L16)≫ 11)⊟R16 . (9)
The attacker then uses n − 1 KPs (pj, cj) to check E
(10...31)
K (pj) = cj
with the value obtained for K0. For every j, where j is at most n− 1, this
equation is satisfied with probability 2−64.
Using the same formulas as in Sect. 4, we find an average time com-
plexity of 2223 for a success probability of 1 − 2−65. A similar attack can
be mounted on other reduced-round block ciphers, each with less than 22
GOST rounds (e.g., rounds 11–31), where a particular subkey is used only
once. Again, attacks similar to those in this section can be applied to the
respective block ciphers even if the S-boxes are not bijective.
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6 Conclusions and Open Problems
This paper presented several meet-in-the-middle attacks on GOST reduced
to up to 22 rounds. To the best of our knowledge, the 22-round attack is
the best attack (going by the number of rounds) to recover the key with
very few known plaintexts.
Our attacks use different approaches – attacks on 14 or fewer rounds
use a straightforward meet-in-the-middle approach and so does the 22-
round attack; in the 16-round attacks, the meet-in-the-middle corresponds
to inner round subkeys rather than middle text values. Our attacks work
in a non-related-key setting.
The time complexity of both the 16-round and 22-round attacks is 2223.
It is required in these attacks that the S-boxes are bijective, but similar
attacks can be constructed as well if this is not the case.
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